Bastion was once the largest British military base in the world. A sea of tents, shipping containers and barricades, plonked on the flat, empty, red Helmand desert. Like the first city on Mars.
At its busiest, Bastion housed up to 14,000 troops. Its 2.2-mile (3.5km) runway was as busy as any international airport. Its perimeter wall was more than 20 miles long.
It had its own hospital, water bottling plant, as well as shops, canteens and gyms. It was a military metropolis from which the British, and later the US Marine corps and Afghans too, directed the fight in Helmand - the hub from which UK forces re-supplied more than 100 smaller bases at the height of the war.
Those have now all gone, and the British presence in Bastion has been almost completely erased.
Even Bastion's memorial wall, which bears the name of each of the 453 British military personnel killed in the conflict, has been removed. It'll be rebuilt at the National Arboretum in Staffordshire.
Not just closer to home but more secure. Helmand's still one of the most dangerous places in Afghanistan.
'Worth the hurt?'
So what might the British leave behind in Afghanistan after a presence of 13 years? What do they have to show for a war that's cost billions of pounds and hundreds of precious lives?
Robert Foster died in Helmand in 2007. The 19-year-old private was killed when an American warplane mistakenly dropped a bomb on his position.
His father John says 'seven years on I still struggle with the fact that my son and his mates were killed in a conflict that should never have happened'.
He describes himself as being proud of what Robbie did: 'I try to hold in my heart that my son and his mates thought they were doing the right thing.'
He also accepts that Afghanistan is now more stable, but he wonders for how long.
The Taliban have already moved back into some of the areas once occupied by the British. John asks: 'Was it worth all the hurt caused to so many?'
'Muddled through'
As this long war draws to a close, it's the question that hangs in the air: 'Was it worth it?' Many in the military believe it's too soon to tell. They're more reluctant to rush to judgement, having witnessed comrades die and suffer life-changing injuries.
It's harder still for those who ordered men into battle. Andrew Mackay was the commander of British forces in Helmand in 2007. After reaching the rank of major general, he resigned his commission - in part out of frustration at the way the war in Afghanistan was conducted.
Looking back, he says: 'We should have done so much better.' There was confusion from the start about the mission. Was it nation building, counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism?
As for counter-narcotics, he says: 'It's a nonsense to suggest we were there to stop heroin getting to the streets of London.' Today poppy production in Afghanistan is at record levels.
The failure to explain must ultimately lie with the politicians in charge. But there were failings by the military too. In the early days there was a switch in tactics every six months as a new brigade commander arrived with a fresh batch of soldiers, often eager to prove themselves in battle.
Commanders did complain about not having enough men and the right equipment but that did not seem to affect their desire 'to get the job done'.
No one questions the bravery of the British soldier but Mr Mackay says 'we muddled through for far too long'.
'Manipulated'
Pacifying Helmand was always going to be tough. The largest province in the country, it was remote, rural and lawless. It had long been a Taliban stronghold and centre of the drugs trade.
Added to that, the British had history in Helmand. The locals still remembered stories of their victory at nearby Maiwand in 1880 during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The returning British may have forgotten, but the Pashtuns of the south had not.
Nor did the British really know what they were getting themselves into when they re-entered Helmand in 2006.
Dr Mike Martin, an academic and former Army reservist, describes how they were 'manipulated' by local tribes to settle old scores with their rivals. He was one of the handful of officers who served in Helmand who was able to speak fluent Pashto.
Camp Bastion
Bastion was a sprawling, well-fortified British-run base the size of the town of Reading and home to 30,000 people It had its own water bottling plant, hospital, police force and even a Pizza Hut It was widely regarded as a safe haven for troops However, in 2012 a Taliban attack breached the perimeter and resulted in the death of two US Marines Its airfield was busier that either Luton or Stansted in terms of aircraft movements including helicopters Source: BBC/MoD Inside Camp Bastion
He argues the British took far too long to understand the people they were trying to win over and 'were trying to turn the war into something it was not'.
Many still hold out hope for Afghanistan's future. It has just witnessed relatively peaceful elections and a transition of power. But there are also those who conclude the war was a mistake.
'Dented confidence'
Richard Streatfield served as a major in the Rifles in Sangin where the British suffered some of their heaviest losses. He arrived as a believer in the mission, but left with many doubts.
In his book Honourable Warriors he concludes: 'Any reading of the culture, the history or politics should have prevented us from taking on Helmand.'
As the British now prepare to leave for good he says: 'It may be dressed up as victory, but it will be the paint on the grave.'
Whatever legacy Britain eventually leaves behind in Helmand, Afghanistan already appears to have had an impact on British foreign policy and any future military intervention.
Mr Mackay asks the question: 'Has it dented our confidence so much that we can no longer put boots on the ground?' Looking at the responses to the crises in Syria and Iraq his answer is 'yes'.
Maj Gen Andrew Mackay's Afghanistan: The Lessons of War will be broadcast on BBC Radio 4 at 20:00 GMT on Tuesday 25 November
0 comments "The end of Bastion"
Post a Comment